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Chapter IV 
I nternational Straits 
by 
Lewis M. Alexander* 
A n international strait, as noted in paragraph 2.3.3 of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9)1 is a strait used for 
international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone. The definition comes from articles 37 and 38 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,2 and includes both straits which at some 
point are overlapped by the territorial seas of the bordering State or States,3 
and those straits through which there is a continuous corridor of high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).4 A strait is a natural waterway, "a 
contraction of the sea between two territories, being of limited width."5 
There are in the world over two hundred waterways which would appear 
to satisfy the requirements of being an "international strait."6 
1. The Transit Passage Regime 
According to the LOS Convention, a regime of transit passage prevails with 
regard both to ships and aircraft through an international strait that is 
overlapped at least at its narrowest part by bordering territorial seas.7 Transit 
passage, "which shall not be impeded,"8 means "the exercise ... of the 
freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous 
and expeditious transit of the strait."9 There are a few carefully-phrased 
exceptions in the Convention to the transit passage provisions, as noted below. 
Passage of ships and aircraft is to take place in their "normal modes" of 
transit,10 a term which the United States interprets as meaning that submarines 
may transit submerged, providing that depths in the strait are sufficient to 
permit such operations. This interpretation, which is reflected in paragraph 
2.3.3.1 ofNWP 9, is consistent with the U.S. negotiating position throughout 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).l1 
Warships and Military Aircraft in Transit Passage. Ships and aircraft, 
while exercising the right of passage, "must proceed without delay through 
or over the strait. "12 The concept of transit passage, however, does not 
preclude passage through the strait "for the purpose of entering, leaving or 
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returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry 
to that State. "13 
While in transit passage, ships and aircraft must avoid "any threat or use 
of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of the State bordering the strait, "14 and "refrain from any activities other 
than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious 
transit, unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress. "15 It is United 
States policy that warships, operating in their normal mode through 
international straits overlapped by territorial seas, may undergo formation 
steaming, and launch and recover aircraft.16 To the extent that such activities 
are incidental to normal navigational practices and do not otherwise constitute 
a threat directed against the bordering states, this interpretation appears 
consistent with the transit passage regime. 
Vessels in transit must comply with "generally accepted international 
regulations, procedures and practices" for (1) safety at sea, and (2) the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ShipS.17 What these 
provisions intend is that transit-passage vessels should comply with the 
international conventions adopted by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) over the past several decades, and which now are in 
force.18 Although this restriction is set forth generally in paragraph 2.1.2 of 
NWP 9 it would be helpful to operational commanders (to whom the Handbook 
is directed) if it were explicitly included in paragraph 2.3.3.1, the paragraph 
dealing with transit passage. 
With regard to safety at sea, there are tw~ basic IMO conventions. One 
is the 1972 Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea.19 The Convention regulates the behavior of ships at sea in respect to 
other vessels in order to prevent collisions, and it deals with such matters 
as lights, sound signals and conduct under conditions of restricted visibility. 
There are also provisions for the establishment of ships' routing systems. 
Under IMO's direction there is now an established world-wide network of 
traffic separation schemes, deep water routes, and areas to be avoided. 
A second convention is the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
(SOLAS).20 It is concerned with vessel construction issues, equipment, safety 
of navigation, and the carriage of dangerous goods. 
The principal IMO convention relating to vessel-source pollution is the 
1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), as 
amended in 1978.21 A State bordering a strait may adopt rules and regulations 
concerning vessel-source pollution, giving effect to the provisions of 
MARPOL. It should be noted, however, that warships, naval auxiliaries, and 
other vessels owned and operated by a State and used at the time being only 
on government non-commercial service, enjoy sovereign immunity and are 
exempt from the provisions of the LOS Convention regarding the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.22 But if a ship, entitled to 
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sovereign immunity, acts in a manner which is contrary to the bordering 
State's laws and regulations, the flag State of the ship "shall bear international 
responsibility for any loss or damage which results to States bordering 
straits. "23 
During transit passage, foreign warships may not carry out research or 
survey activities without the prior authorization of the State bordering the 
strait.24 They must also respect designated sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes, if these were established in conformity with generally accepted 
international regulations.25 The latter of these restrictions is in paragraph 
2.3.3.1 of NWP 9, but curiously the former is not. 
Military aircraft in transit passage shall normally comply with the Rules 
of the Air established by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), "and will at all times operate with due regard for the safety of 
navigation."26 They also shall "at all times monitor the radio frequency 
assigned by the competent internationally designated air traffic control 
authority or the appropriate international distress radio frequency."'1:1 
NWP 9 articulates the view that the transit passage regime of the 1982 
Convention remains viable in time of conflict. This approach to the Law of 
Neutrality posits that neutral nations cannot suspend, hamper or otherwise 
impede the right of transit passage of surface ships, submarines and aircraft 
of belligerent States through international straits. Under this view, belligerent 
forces in transit must proceed without delay, and must refrain from the threat 
or use of force against the neutral nation, or from acts of hostility or other 
activities not incident to their transit. The forces may not use international 
straits as a place of sanctuary or a base of operations, and warships may not 
exercise the belligerent right of visit and search in such waters. When in 
transit, however, belligerent forces may take such defensive measures as are 
consistent with their security, including the launching and recovery of 
aircraft, screen formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance.28 
This application of the transit passage regime to the traditional law of 
neutrality seeks to preserve the balance between the rights of neutral States 
to preserve the inviolability of their territorial seas and the rights of 
belligerents to conduct armed conflict at sea. To what extent this approach 
will be embraced by other States remains to be seen,29 although recent practice 
in the Straits of Hormuz would seem to indicate acceptance of this position. 
With respect to belligerent military aircraft, NWP 9 provides that the 
airspace above international straits remains open at all times to transit passage. 
Such passage must be continuous and expeditious, and must be undertaken 
in the normal mode of flight for the respective type of aircraft. The aircraft 
must refrain from any acts of hostility, but may engage in activities that are 
consistent with their security and the security of accompanying surface and 
subsurface forces.30 Again, state practice in the Straits of Hormuz during the 
Iran-Iraq conflict seems to support this interpretation. 
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Rights and Duties ~f the Bordering State. The State bordering an 
international strait may, as noted earlier, "designate sea lanes and prescribe 
traffic separation schemes . . . where necessary to promote the safe passage 
of ships. "31 These sea lanes and traffic separation schemes must conform to 
standards set by IMO. Moreover, the bordering State may, when 
circumstances require, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes 
for those previously designated, although prior to the actual substitution, the 
bordering State must refer proposals to IMO with a view to the proposal's 
adoption.32 States bordering straits "shall clearly indicate all sea lanes and 
traffic separation schemes . . . on charts to which due publicity shall be 
given. "33 
A State bordering an international strait may adopt laws and regulations 
relating to "the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and 
regulations" of the bordering State.34 Any bordering State's laws or 
regulations relating to sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, or to the 
loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person "shall not 
discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships or in their application 
have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of 
transit passage.35 
According to the LOS Convention, there are two additional duties of a 
state bordering a strait. One is that it "give appropriate publicity to any 
danger to navigation or overflight within or over the strait of which [it has] 
knowledge."36 The second is that it should by agreement with user States 
cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of "necessary navigational 
and safety aids or other improvements in aid of international navigation. "37 
NWP 9 would benefit from inclusion of these duties in its treatment of 
international straits. 
Summarizing the rights and duties of warships and military aircraft passing 
through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the 
high seas or exclusive economic zones, it is clear from the LOS Convention 
that such vessels or aircraft enjoy unimpeded transit passage in their normal 
modes of continuous and expeditious transit. The vessels must respect IMO-
sanctioned sea lanes and traffic separation schemes and the aircraft shall 
normally comply with ICAO safety measures and monitor assigned radio 
frequencies. Warships must not carry out marine scientific research while 
in transit without authorization of the bordering State, and cannot load or 
unload commodities, currencies or persons in contravention of the laws and 
regulations of the bordering State. While the Convention's provisions 
regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not 
apply to vessels having sovereign immunity, if the warship, in violating the 
bordering State's laws and regulations, causes loss or damage, the flag State 
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(e.g., the United States) bears international responsibility for such loss or 
damage. 
What can the crew of a warship expect from the bordering State? That 
its sea lanes and traffic separation schemes conform to IMO standards. That 
any laws and regulations applying to warships do not negatively impact on 
the right of transit passage. That the State give publicity to any danger to 
navigation or overflight of which it has knowledge. That it establishes and 
maintains in the strait necessary navigation and safety aids. That under no 
condition does it suspend the right of transit passage to warships or military 
aircraft of States at peace with the bordering State, but involved in conflict 
with another State. NWP 9 accurately reflects these important principles.38 
Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage. Independent island countries possessing 
certain geographical characteristics may delimit straight baselines 
encompassing the archipelago, joining together the outermost islands and 
drying reefs.39 Single baselines must not exceed 100 nautical miles in length,4o 
nor may they depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration 
of the archipelago. 
Seaward of the baselines the archipelagic State may measure its territorial 
sea and exclusive economic zone. Within the baselines, the waters are termed 
"archipelagic waters," and have virtually the same status as territori~l 
waters.41 NWP 9 notes that the United States recognizes the right of 
qualifying States to establish archipelagic baselines and waters.42 Traversing 
the archipelagic State are archipelagic sea lanes and air routes; these corridors 
join international straits located on the periphery of the enclosed State. The 
sea lanes and air routes include "all normal passage routes used as routes for 
international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters. "43 
Through such sea lanes and air routes, warships and military aircraft enjoy 
"the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the 
purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit. "44 
The sea lanes and air routes are defined by a series of continuous axis lines 
from the entry to the exit points of the archipelago, and ships and aircraft 
in archipelagic sea lanes passage must not deviate more than 25 miles to either 
side of such axis lines during passage. In cases where the width of the 
waterway is less than 50 miles, transiting ships and aircraft must not navigate 
closer to the coast than 10 per cent of the distance between the nearest points 
on islands bordering the sea lane.45 The depiction of an archipelagic sealane 
provided in Figure 2-1 of NWP 9 provides a visual illustration of this latter 
concept. 
As in the case of international straits, the bordering or archipelagic State 
may designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes within the archipelagic 
sea lanes, conforming to IMO standards. When circumstances require, the 
State may substitute other sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, after first 
submitting proposals to IMO. Warships must respect sea lanes and traffic 
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separation schemes established in accordance with IMO procedures. Other 
rights and duties of warships and military aircraft in international straits apply 
mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage.46 
NWP 9 states the position that belligerent ships or aircraft, including 
submarines, surface warships, and military aircraft, retain the right of 
unimpeded archipelagic sea lanes passage through, over, and under 
archipelagic sea lanes. Such forces may engage in those activities that are 
incident to their normal mode of continuous and expeditious passage, are 
consistent with their security, and, in the case of aircraft, are consistent with 
the security of accompanying surface and subsurface forces.47 Again, as with 
international straits, it is not clear whether other States will agree with 
superimposing the newly emerged principles of archipelagic waters on the 
traditional law of neutrality.48 
Although a number of island nations have declared themselves to be 
"archipelagic States" and have delimited straight baselines about their 
territory,49 none have formally designated archipelagic sea lanes and air 
routes. In these cases, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be 
exercised through the inter-island routes normally used for international 
navigation.50 
2. The History of the Transit Passage Regime 
The concept of transit passage through international straits, and of the 
analogous regime through archipelagic sea lanes, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Even in the years immediately following World War II, there 
were no universal principles concerning straits passage, and no consideration 
of archipelagic sea lanes even existed. 
Pre-UNCLOS I. Prior to 1949 the regime of passage through international 
straits overlapped by territorial seas was generally regarded as one of innocent 
passage, which "requires no supporting argument or citation. "51 Whether 
innocent passage referred to both warships and merchant vessels was not 
firmly established.52 Where the minimum breadth of the strait was greater 
than the combined territorial sea breadths, a belt of high seas existed through 
the water way; within such a belt the high seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight prevailed. The United States watched with considerable anxiety 
the gradual extension of territorial sea claims to breadths of up to twelve 
miles,53 for this in effect closed off to air and subsurface navigation a 
considerable number of important straits, among them Gibraltar, Hormuz, 
and Malacca. 
The first international action to regulate the regime of passage through 
international straits came in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case, between the United 
Kingdom and Albania, which was decided by the International Court of 
Justice.54 Two British destroyers were damaged by Albanian mines while 
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passing through the Corfu Channel between the Greek island of Corfu and 
the Albanian mainland, with the resultant killing of 44 British seamen. Albania 
argued before the Court first, that the Corfu Channel was not an international 
strait, and second, that the British warships had no right of transit through 
the waterway without prior authorization by Albania. 
The Court held that Corfu Channel was indeed an international strait, not 
because of the volume of traffic moving through the waterway, nor of the 
importance of the strait to world commerce, but because of "its geographical 
situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being 
used for international navigation. "55 In other words, "it is sufficient that a 
strait be a 'useful route for international maritime traffic for it to be 
considered an international strait.' ~'56 
With regard to the right of British warships to transit the Corfu Channel, 
the Court held that in time of peace a State has the right to send its warships 
through such straits without prior authorization by the coastal State, provided 
such passage is innocent. 
Seven months later, the International Law Commission, established within 
the framework of the United Nations, began work on a codification of the 
regime of the high seas and the territorial sea. One result was a draft article 
on straits, which read "There must be no suspension of the innocent passage 
of foreign vessels through straits normally used for international navigation 
between two parts of the high seas. "57 The word "normally" had been 
included at the suggestion of the Soviet member and over the objections of 
the United States member. 
The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. The International Law 
Commission's draft was used as a basis for negotiations at the 1958 Law of 
the Sea Conference (UNCLOS I), and article 16(4) of the subsequent 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone reads "There 
shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits 
which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas 
and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State. "58 
Three points are noteworthy in this article. First, i~ocent passage is non-
suspendable, although it remains up to the coastal State to determine when 
passage by foreign vessels is non-innocent. Second, the word "normally" is 
omitted, adding to the confusion of the meaning of the phrase "used for 
international navigation. " Third, there is inclusion of the term" the territorial 
sea of a foreign State," an obvious reference to the Strait of Tiran, bordered 
by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which leads to the Gulf of Aqaba, at whose 
northern end are small areas of the territorial waters of Israel and Jordan. 
In 1958 the status of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba was a burning issue 
between Israel and Egypt.59 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone came into 
force in 1964, but already there were evident deficiencies in the straits articles. 
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How subjective was a State's decision to declare certain types of passage as 
"non-innocent" and therefore disallowed? Were nuclear submarines, armed 
with ballistic missiles, expected to travel on the surface through international 
straits and show their flag-as is required for innocent passage through 
territorial waters? Could the overflight of territorial seas within straits be 
undertaken without the consent of the coastal State? And what did Article 
23 of the Convention mean when it stated "If any warship does not comply 
with the regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the 
territorial sea" it may be required to leave the area? Did this apply to the 
territorial waters of international straits? 
Another problem soon arose with respect to archipelagic States. Indonesia, 
in 1957, purported to close off its inter-island waters by a series of straight 
baselines, declaring the waters within the baselines to be internal. The United 
States and other maritime powers refused to recognize this closure, but in 
the early days of the Third Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) starting 
in 1973, efforts were made to achieve some form of compromise with States 
composed solely of one or more archipelagos.60 
UNCLOS III. The United States, the Soviet Union, and other major 
maritime States were determined, at UNCLOS III, to improve on the non-
suspendable innocent passage regime for international straits, but their efforts 
were opposed by a number of States, among them Spain and Morocco 
(bordering the Strait of Gibraltar), Southern Yemen (Bab el Mandeb), Iran 
and Oman (the Strait of Hormuz) and Malaysia and Indonesia (Malacca-
Singapore Straits). The United Kingdom advanced, and both the U.S. and 
the Soviets supported, the concept of transit passage, and articles 37 through 
44 of the 1982 Convention spell out the details of this regime. Also article 
53 defines the regime of passage in archipelagic sea lanes. These provisions 
are supplemented by other Articles of the Convention relating specifically 
to the rights of Government-owned vessels and aircraft (except those used 
for commercial purposes) through international straits.61 
The LOS Convention was adopted at Montego Bay, Jamaica, in December 
1982 by a vote of 130 in favor, 4 against (including the United States), and 
17 abstentions. The basic cause of the U.S. non-support was Part XI of the 
Convention, dealing with the international seabed regime. Since the United 
States not only voted against the final text, but has subsequently refused to 
sign, and has indicated its intention not to ratify or accede to the Convention, 
the question could arise, are all of the navigational rights contained in the 
text, necessarily applicable to the United States? This issue might conceivably 
become more acute if and when the Convention ultimately enters into force.62 
The United States' position is that the non-seabed portions of the 
Convention are declaratory of emerging customary international law, and 
are therefore binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to the 
Convention.63 Scholars may, however, debate what the bases for emerging 
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customary international law really are, and why the United States, despite 
its views on the sanctity of the non-seabed articles, chooses to interpret article 
64 on highly-migratory species (e.g., tuna) in a way which appears at variance 
with the text.64 
3. Exceptions to the Transit Passage Regime 
NWP 9 acknowledges, in a fleeting fashion,65 that some straits are governed 
by the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage rather than transit passage. 
The text would be enhanced by a broader coverage of the exceptions. 
Innocent Passage Straits. Innocent passage is defined in the LOS 
Convention as "passage which is not detrimental to the peace, good order, 
or security of the coastal State."66 The Convention lists a series of activities 
as non-conforming with innocent passage, among them any threat or use of 
force against the coastal State, collecting information to the prejudice of the 
coastal State's defense or security, or the carrying out of research or survey 
activities.67 Innocent passage is the regime for transiting the territorial sea. 
It also applies to navigation through straits which connect the high seas or 
an EEZ with the territorial sea or a bordering State, or straits excluded from 
the regime of transit passage by article 38(1).68 In the case 'of such straits, 
the regime of innocent passage is non-suspendable by the bordering State.69 
There are two potential situations in which innocent passage straits may 
exist. One is where the strait leads from the high seas/EEZ directly into a 
coastal State's territorial waters without later re-emerging into the high seas 
or an EEZ. Such is the case, for example, with Canada's Queen Charlotte 
Strait between the northern end of Vancouver Island and the mainland of 
British Columbia. Relatively few of the waterways of this type are officially 
named.70 
A second situation is where the strait connects the high seas/EEZ with 
an historic bay-whose waters are by definition internal. Such a bay would 
be closed off by a straight baseline, seaward of which are territorial waters. 
There are no generally-accepted criteria for establishing claims to historic 
bays, and the United States, which itself has few historic claims,71 tends to 
resist such claims by other States.72 But there are some straits connecting with 
water bodies where the coastal State asserts strong historic claims.73 
Straits Not Overlapped by Territorial Seas. According to the LOS 
Convention, transit passage does not apply to a strait "if there exists through 
the strait a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic 
zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical 
characteristics. "74 Through such a route, or "corridor," the high seas 
freedoms of navigation and overflight would automatically exist. 
If all States claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea, then all straits with least 
widths of less than 24 miles would have no such corridor. But a number of 
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States, including Australia and Finland, have territorial seas ofless than twelve 
miles. This will permit a high seas/EEZ corridor through such waterways 
as Bass Strait, separating Tasmania from the Australian mainland, and the 
Entrance to the Gulf of Finland.75 Any international strait, greater in least 
width than 24 miles, would ipso facto have a high seas/EEZ corridor passing 
through it. 
Three questions arise with respect to this provision. A first concerns the 
meaning of "similar convenience." The navigable channel, for example, 
might not coincide with the high seas/EEZ corridor. Associated with this 
is the issue of the minimum width the corridor must have in order to be a 
viable transit route. In The Bahamas, for example, a twelve-mile territorial 
sea would leave a corridor of only a quarter of a mile width through 
Providence Channel at its narrowest point. How could a foreign naval 
squadron utilize such a narrow space? In order to qualify as being of "similar 
convenience," the corridor should probably be two or three miles in width 
at its narrowest point.76 
Finally, there is the question of the status of the territorial waters adjoining 
the high seas/EEZ corridor. Presumably the status is one of suspendable 
innocent passage, with no right of overflight by foreign aircraft, nor of passage 
submerged by foreign submarines.77 
The "Messina Exception." There are certain specific exceptions 
provided for in the Convention to the transit passage regime, even for straits 
connecting two parts of the high seas or an EEZ with one another. One of 
these is the "Messina exception, " which was intended primarily to cover the 
situation of Italy's Strait of Messina, between the mainland and the island 
of Sicily. This waterway, which has a minimum width of about two miles, 
was of concern to the Italian Government in the event that a potentially hostile 
fleet might seek transit passage rights through the strait. In response to Italy's 
fears, a provision was included in the Convention stating that a right of transit 
passage is excepted "if a strait is formed by an island of a State bordering 
the strait and the mainland" provided "there exists seaward of the island a 
route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar 
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteris-
tics. "78 Although the Convention does not so state, a right of non-suspendable 
innocent passage would exist through any strait as defined by article 38(1). 
There are some uncertainties regarding the article. First, as noted earlier, 
what does the phrase "of similar convenience" mean? Should conditions of 
fog, ice, channel depth, or travel distance associated with the alternative route 
be no more adverse than with respect to the original waterway? In the case 
of distance, a ship utilizing the Strait of Messina on a voyage from Marseilles 
to Trieste would save approximately 60 miles from a route traveling around 
the island of Sicily. 
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Looking at straits other than Messina, article 38( 1) might apply to the U.K. ' s 
Pentland Firth between the Scottish mainland and the Orkney Islands, to 
Sweden's Kalmar Sund in the Baltic, and to Canada's Northumberland Strait 
in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. But there are definitional questions. For example, 
what constitutes the "mainland"? Can South Korea claim Cheju Strait as an 
article 38(1) exception when the mainland is actually a series of small islands 
and islets? In the western Aegean there is Keas Strait, close to Athens, which 
Greece might claim as an exception, although the "mainland" here is formed 
by the island of Mikronisos, about a mile off the true mainland coast. 
No matter what the geographic situation might be, it would appear from 
a reading of article 38(1) that a strait, in order to be excepted, should at some 
point be closed off by overlapping territorial seas. Further, the alternative 
route must include through it a high seas or EEZ corridor. Given the 
propensity of States to alter their territorial sea claims, there exists 
considerable uncertainty as to which straits of the world would qualify as 
article 38(1) exceptions. United States policy is that the number of straits 
excepted under this article should be kept to an absolute minimum. 
Straits Regulated by International Conventions. Another exception to 
the transit-passage regime is contained in article 35(c) which exempts straits 
in which passage "is regulated by long-standing conventions in force 
specifically relating to such straits." The obvious reference here is to the 
Turkish Straits,79 which are regulated by the 1936 Montreux Convention.so 
This Convention guarantees freedom of transit through the Straits for 
merchant vessels of all nations at all times. But there is no corresponding 
right of free overflight of the Turkish Straits. The Convention also contains 
certain restrictions on the transit of warships of both non-Black Sea powers 
and Black Sea powers, one of them being that the maximum aggregate 
tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea powers within the Black Sea at any 
one time must not exceed 45,000 tons. 
Another waterway to which this article might apply is the Danish Straits 
(Little Belt, Great Belt and Oresund), the subject of an 1857 Convention which 
lifted the dues requirements for ships transiting the Straits.Sl Since foreign 
warships at that time were not subject to such dues, some recent writers have 
argued that Denmark has no legal grounds for interfering with the passage 
of foreign warships through the Straits. But a 1976 Danish Ordinance requires 
advance notification for the passage of foreign warships through the Straits, 
demands that foreign submarines operate on the surface flying their flag, and 
notes that military aircraft can overfly Danish territorial waters (including 
those within the Straits) only if advance permission has been obtained.82 
Two other straits that might conceivably be affected by the article are 
Gibraltar and Tiran. A 1904 Declaration between Great Britain and France 
regarding Egypt and Morocco guaranteed freedom of navigation through the 
Strait of Gibraltar, but made no mention of overflight rights.83 The 
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Government of Spain has on occasion held that since Gibraltar is governed 
by the 1904 Declaration, freedom of overflight through the Strait does not 
exist. In 1973, at the outset of fighting between Israel and Egypt, U.S. military 
aircraft flying east from the Azores in order to supply Israeli forces, navigated 
through the approximately two-mile wide high-seas belt at the narrowest 
point in the Strait in order to avoid the three-mile territorial seas (then 
recognized by the United States) of Spain and Morocco. But in the 1986 air 
strikes on Libyan terrorist support infrastructure (after the United States had 
acknowledged other States' rights to a twelve-mile territorial sea) U.S. 
military aircraft operating from bases in Great Britain utilized the transit 
passage regime, as provided for in the LOS Convention, to justify overflying 
the Strait of Gibraltar. 
In the case of the Strait of Tiran, the waterway, as noted earlier, connects 
the high seas/EEZ of the Red Sea with the territorial waters of the two 
bordering States, but also with the territorial seas ofIsrael and Jordan. Article 
4S(1){b) of the LOS Convention provides for a regime of non-suspendable 
innocent passage through straits "between a part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State." Following 
the independence of Israel in 1948, Egypt sought to restrict the movement 
of Israeli shipping through the Strait on the grounds that it did not constitute 
"innocent passage" so far as Egypt was concerned. Twice Israeli forces 
occupied the Egyptian heights overlooking Tiran to ensure that the Strait 
would be open to Israeli shipping. The 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt 
and Israel provides "The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf 
of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded 
and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight."84 Does this 1979 
Treaty represent a "long-standing international convention," and what is its 
effect on Saudi Arabia, guarding the eastern shore of the Strait, since that 
country is not a party to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty? 
Internal Waters in a Strait. The transit passage regime does not apply 
in any areas of internal waters within a strait, "except where the 
establishment of a straight baseline . . . has the effect of enclosing as internal 
waters areas which had not previously been considered as such. "85 The 
relatively few cases where internal waters exist within a strait are in 
connection withjuridical86 or historic bays, river mouths, harbor systems and 
roadsteads, and with straight baseline regimes. In the Corfu Channel, for 
example, a juridical bay exists along the western (Greek) shore and serves 
to narrow somewhat the width of the belt through which the transit passage 
regime applies. Other affected straits include the Oresund and the Strait of 
Hormuz. In the case of the Oresund, Copenhagen's roadstead extends about 
three miles into the main waterway, forcing the traffic lane eastward toward 
Sweden. 
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In the Strait of Hormuz, the Omam straight baseline system joins the 
mainland with the offshore islands out to the Great and Little Quoin, with 
the result that the traffic separation zone, landward of the Quoins, passes 
within the baseline. Although to date Oman has not sought to limit in any 
way passage along this sea lane, it might conceivably argue that the waters 
within the baseline had previously been considered as internal, and therefore 
were not subject to the transit passage regime. 
Straits Connecting With the Territorial Sea of a Foreign State. A final 
exception to transit passage is a convention provision which calls for non-
suspendable innocent passage in ~ strait "between a part of the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State. "87 
Mention has already been made of the Strait ofTiran, for which this provision 
was intended. The only other straits to which this provision might apply are 
Head Harbour Passage, leading through Canadian waters off the Province 
of New Brunswick to Passamaquoddy Bay, shared by New Brunswick and 
the State of Maine; Guatemala's Entrance to the Bay d'Amatique; and two 
shallow waterways in the Persian Gulf-the Bahrain-Qatar Passage leading 
to Saudi Arabian waters; and the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage connecting 
with the waters of Qatar. 
5. The Record of State Practice 
NWP 9 does not address the record of State compliance with the transit 
passage regime. Given the stated purpose of that publication, this is probably 
unnecessary. It would be appropriate here, however, to examine what that 
record has been. The principal deviations from the Convention's straits 
articles have occurred in the Arctic. In 1985, the Canadian Government 
delimited a series of straight baselines about its Arctic Archipelago in reaction 
to the transit through the Northwest Passage of the u.S. Coast Guard vessel, 
POLAR SEA.88 The Government also announced that the waters within the 
baselines were henceforth to be considered internal waters, with no right of 
free navigation existing through them. The legal justifications for Canada's 
actions have been variously described as environmental protection, the 
exercise of historic rights, the non-application of articles 37 and 38 to the 
Northwest Passage, or simply the delimitation of straight baselines in 
accordance with the provisions of the LOS Convention.89 The United States 
protested Canada's enclosure action, but three years later concluded an 
agreement with Canada which, on the one hand, provided for prior 
notification by the u.S. in the event of its sending ice breakers through the 
Northwest Passage, and on the other reserved the u.S. position with regard 
to the Canadian assertion that the Northwest passage did not qualify as an 
international strait.90 The United States was particularly concerned that if 
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it acquiesced in the Canadians' action, other States might also close off 
bordering straits on environmental or other grounds. 
The Soviet Union considers the waters of the Laptev, East Siberian, and 
Chuckchi Seas, north of Siberia, as having a "special status" of their own. 
In 1967, for example, the Soviets turned back two U.S. Coast Guard vessels, 
the EDISTO and the EASTWIND, which were traveling eastward from the 
Barents and Kara Seas, and attempting to pass through Vil'kitsky Strait into 
the Laptev Sea. The Soviets never explained the rationale for their action, 
but so far as is known, no foreign-flag vessels since then have travelled in 
the Soviets' northern waters to the east ofVil'kitsky Strait.91 
Outside of the Arctic basin, the Soviets apparently consider the Sea of 
Okhotsk, off the eastern Siberian coast, as a "closed sea," not open to foreign 
warships. Most of the coastline of the Sea is Soviet territory, although Japan 
controls some 50 miles of the coast on the island of Hokkaido. The Soviet 
position affects the passage of foreign warships through the straits of the 
Kurile Islands, leading into Okhotsk. Elsewhere, China considers Hainan 
Strait, connecting the South China Sea with the Gulf of Tonkin, to be an 
"historic" strait, although nowhere in the LOS Convention is there provision 
for an international strait to be claimed as historic. 
One situation which might in time prove troublesome is Greece's policy 
toward the regime of passage through the inter-island waters of the Aegean 
Sea. The islands are controlled by Greece, but the waterways lead to Turkey. 
Because the islands are a part of Greece-basically a mainland country-they 
cannot be closed off as an archipelagic State, and Greece has maintained, first, 
that not all the inter-island passages are international straits, and second, that 
Greece reserves the right to designate the waterways to which the transit 
passage regime applies.92 The issue of passage through non-archipelagic island 
groups was never settled at UNCLOS III. 
6. The Relative Importance of International Straits 
There is no fixed method for determining which straits are more important 
than others. One possible index is the number of transiting ships per day. 
In this respect, the leading straits are: Dover, Malacca-Singapore, Kattegat 
(at the northern approach to the Danish Straits), Gibraltar, Hormuz, and the 
Turkish Straits. It is difficult to obtain reliable statistics on many other straits, 
since no generally-available method of counting numbers of transits through 
these waterways exists. 
Choke Points. Straits constituting strategic choke points are of critical 
economic and military importance. The term "choke point" implies that in 
the case of a particular waterway there is an opportunity for a State to close 
off, or at least restrict, the flow of ocean-borne traffic which is critical to 
a nation or nations. Three issues would appear to be of importance with 
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respect to choke points. First, there is no readily available alternative 
waterway to use if passage through the choke point is denied or restricted. 
The Strait of Hormuz is an obvious choke point in this regard; a strait, such 
as Anegada Passage, connecting the Caribbean with the Atlantic, would not 
be a prime choke point because of the number of alternative waterways 
available. 
Second, a choke point is relatively narrow, and thus capable of being 
blocked-by mines, sunken ships, shore batteries, etc. Third, the waterway 
is of importance to the commercial and/or military traffic of some State or 
States. With respect to this last point, a distinction might be made between 
"global" and "regional" choke points. Gibraltar is a global choke point, of 
concern to many of the world's nations; the Turkish Straits are more regional 
in nature, of particular significance to the countries bordering the Black Sea. 
Various listings of choke points are periodically compiled but with most 
analysts agreeing on the basic seven: the Danish Straits, Dover, Gibraltar, 
Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, Malacca-Singapore, and Lombok (or Sunda) at the 
southern approaches to Indonesia. The Suez and Panama Canals are also choke 
points. Other frequent candidates are the Turkish Straits, Magellan, Bering 
Strait, Korea Strait, Osumi (Colnett) Strait-a major approach to the Sea 
ofJapan and South Korea-Formosa Strait, and Windward and Mona Passages 
in the Caribbean. Some listings also include the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, 
although this is hardly a narrow international waterway. 
Other Important Straits. In addition to the straits noted above, some 
sixteen others would seem to be of concern to the u.S. and its allies. These 
are: Anegada Passage, Balabac Strait, the Straits of Florida, Kasos and Kithira 
Straits in the eastern Aegean, Luzon Strait, Makassar Strait, the Strait of 
Otranto, San Bernardino Strait, Soya-kaikyo (La Perouse Strait), Surigao 
Strait, Strait ofTiran, Torres Strait, Tsugaru-kaikyo, Unimak Pass, and Verde 
Island Passage. This is not meant to imply that other straits are not also 
significant, but perhaps these are the most strategic at this point in time. 
For the United States, all straits are of potential importance, since no one 
can forecast where future military operations may be necessary.93 Who, for 
example, in 1940, could have predicted that within two years the U.S. would 
be vitally concerned with the geography of Indispensable, Manning and 
Bougainville Straits in the Solomon Islands-or, a short time later, with 
Dampier, Vitiaz and Isumrud Straits off northeastern New Guinea? 
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